Germany's specific goals in achieving world power status, and the extent of territorial acquisitions abroad that she sought (assuming there was a deliberate -rather than an opportunistic -policy of imperial expansion), have been disputed. It is generally assumed, however, that there was a close relationship between commercial and colonial activity and the direction of German naval policy 3 . The maxim »trade follows the flag« was one commonly accepted in the latter decades of the Nineteenth Century, and in Germany the Flottenverein (Navy League) and the Kolonialgesellschaft (Colonial Society) generally complemented each other's goals in advocating imperialistic expansion 4 . The Navy required coaling stations for its warships, and mercantile interests needed raw materials and markets for their goods; the interdependence was obvious.
It is necessary, however, to analyze more closely the role of the German Navy in colonial affairs, particularly in terms of the changing strategic requirements and basing concepts of what was, after all, a military institution. The majority of Germany's African and Asian colonies were precipitously acquired by Chancellor Otto v. Bismarck in 1884, at a time when the little German Navy played an insignificant role in policy considerations, and when its steam-sail warships, sailing ships with auxiliary steam propulsion, were relatively independent of coaling stations abroad. By the 1890 s, however, with the technological transition to full steam propulsion and the appeal of a commerce-raiding strategy of cruiser-warfare, the Navy became interested in overseas bases. None of Germany's existing colonies promised to satisfy the Navy's logistical and strategic requirements, however, and hence the acquisition of suitable locations was advocated. But this advocacy was short-lived, nor did it enjoy the support of the naval establishment as a whole; and when Alfred Tirpitz came to power in 1897, he was determined to concentrate on building a battle fleet in home waters, and generally opposed further commitments abroad.
The question of overseas acquisitions did play a role in Tirpitz's maneuvers to induce the Reichstag to pass his navy bills creating a larger battle fleet, but the motive here was political rather than substantive. The colonial officials, in fact, gradually came to realize that the Navy had no intention of protecting the colonies in time of war, and in 1914 the overseas possessions were left to their own devices. Whatever the motives behind Tirpitz's Flottenpolitik, they did not include the acquisition of colonies. The Navy had come into being in 1871 with the unification of the German Reich, but its development was slow. The first head of the Admiralty was an infantry general, Albrecht v. Stosch, whose army career hardly equipped him to head the Navy, and whose subsequent political friction with Chancellor Bismarck bode ill for the fortunes 35 MGM 1/77 of the service he now headed 5 . In a memorandum of May 6, 1872 Stosch stated the should direct colonizing projects, as they had little national feeling, and usually depended on England's omni-present Royal Navy for protection 10 .
Whatever Stosch's colonization ideas, they were politically motivated, and did not reflect the requirements of the Navy itself. The small steam-sail warships cruising on foreign station had little need for the coaling stations that were to become so vital later, and the various ports of the world adequately met their requirements for occasional overhauling and repairs. In addition, the'small Navy budget would not justify the expense of acquiring, developing, and maintaining Germany's own naval bases abroad 11 .
Career Navy officers hoped that Stosch's successor would come from their own ranks, and that the Navy would then become a truly independent service. But this was not to be. It was another Army general, Georg Leo v. Caprivi, later German chancellor, who was appointed Chief of the Admiralty from 1883 to 1888. A General of Infantry, Caprivi had little interest in the Navy and even less in colonial enterprises. »I hear you are opposed to colonies«, said Bismarck after Caprivi became head of the Navy. »Yes«, replied Caprivi simply. »I am too«, the Chancellor assured him 12 .
Caprivi's attitude reflected his preoccupation with a possible two-front war by France and Russia against Germany, in which case the Navy's strategy would merely be the passive one of coast defense. Overseas commitments and colonial adventures could only detract from this primary role. Protecting the trade-routes and the occasional requirements of gunboat diplomacy were minor supplementary obligations 13 .
It was only the next year, however, in 1884, that Bismarck suddenly reversed his previous overseas policies and acquired a colonial empire for the Reich. Imperial protection was granted to business enterprises in southwest Africa in April, and Togo and Kamerun on the West African coast were claimed in July. This activity excited an erratic twenty-eight year old adventurer named Karl Peters, who frantically collected the Xs of numerous native chiefs in East Africa on treaties signing away their territories, and that autumn he returned to Berlin and jubilantly presented them to Bismarck. The Chancellor demurred at first; but when Peters threatened to sell his treaties to the Belgians or the English, Bismarck gave in and sanctioned his claims in February 1885 14 . In the Pacific Bismarck had already acquired northeastern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands in November 1884. In August of the following year Bismarck claimed the Caroline Islands (but yielded when Spain objected), and the Marshalls in October 15 .
In less than a year and a half, Bismarck had secured for Germany a colonial empire of impressive size and extent, if not wealth. But this empire was not to be the political and economic asset that Bismarck had perhaps thought it would become, and he always treated it with contempt 16 . Bismarck's surprising incursion into the colonial field has prompted a debate among historians that promises to have no end. Economic, diplomatic, political, and social interpretations have all been advanced and elaborately documented, leaving the conclusion that Bismarck's motives were as complex as that great figure himself 17 . No one, however, has suggested that the desires of the German Navy played a role in these acquisitions, nor would the documentation support such an interpretation 18 . Yet the existence of overseas colonies, linked to the homeland by maritime commerce, ultimately depended on the protection of naval units abroad. It was the frigates »Leipzig« and »Elisabeth«, as well as smaller gunboats, in fact, which brought the flag and the imperial commissioners to the far-flung territories. But in 1884 and 1885 the German Navy was merely the obedient instrument of colonial acquisition. Its requirements were not considered in the formation of a colonial empire, nor was it even solicited for an opinion. Bismarck hoped to avoid embarrassing political commitments and government expenses by having private enterprise assume the burden of administering and developing the colonies gained. »Germany will do what England has always done, establish Chartered Companies, so that the responsibility always rests with them.« 19 But this hope was in vain. There would have to be an initial outlay of funds to develop the harbor and transportation facilities necessary for ultimate profitable exploitation of the mineral and agricultural resources of the possessions; and the individuals and merchant firms at whose instance the colonies had been acquired, proved either unable or unwilling to make this initial investment. In addition, these circles were politically astute enough to realize that the government, having extended official protection to the colonies, was committed to retaining and defending them 20 . Though four companies \yere formed specifically for the colonies, they either refused sovereign rights or soon divested themselves of them, and imperial commissioners had to be despatched to administer the territories 21 .
No sooner had the colonies been gained than a military presence was required to secure them. German sovereignty was challenged, not by other colonial powers -England in particular was preoccupied with the Mahdist rebellion in the Sudan and the relief of Khartoum, and Prime Minister Gladstone had little interest in imperialism anywaybut rather on the part of some of the new German subjects 22 At that time it seemed hopeless that Germany could ever match the leading fleet (the Royal Navy) in size. A more subtle strategy had to be developed that would avoid a major fleet confrontation. The answer seemed to be a commerce-raiding strategy of cruiser-warfare, advocated by a French school of thought, the jeune ecole or »Young School«. While torpedo boats prevented a close blockade of the home coast and ports, commerce-raiders would prowl the trade routes of the enemy, sinking ships and disrupting maritime commerce -»Shamelessly attack the weak, shamelessly fly from the strong.« 30 This French strategy (la guerre de course) was oriented against England, whose whole economic structure depended on sea-borne imports of food and raw materials. The commerce-raiding strategy was not intended to »starve out« England, but rather to produce economic chaos and panic with high 38 insurance rates and high prices, driving the masses to revolt and demand peace.
Cruiser-warfare (Kreuzerkrieg) was attractive to the German Navy for it implied an active role by a small fleet, and in addition would not require large funds that an obstinate Reichstag would be unlikely to allocate. No longer, however, could commerce-raiders like the Confederate »Alabama« keep to the seas for months at a time. Developments in naval technology had been occuring that profoundly affected the tactical implementation of a cruiser-warfare strategy. The transition from sail to steam meant that bases overseas were now necessary for refuelling purposes, and this requirement caused a renewed interest on the part of the Navy in colonial affairs. The great advantages of steam power over sail in being independent of wind and current far outweighed the disadvantages, and other considerations based on ordnance and engineering advances resulted in the universal adoption of steam as the sole means of propulsion by the 1890s. But the reciprocating steam engines of the time devoured coal at a prodigious rate, and made coal consumption the dominant problem in the employment of warships. The armored cruiser »Scharnhorst«, Graf v. Spee's flagship in the Far East at the outbreak of war in 1914, carried 2,000 tons of coal giving her a radius of action of 5,168 sea miles at a cruising speed of 10 knots, enough for 21.5 days. A 15 knot speed reduced the range to 3,513 miles and 9.8 days, while at 20 knots the range was only 2,222 miles, with coal bunkers empty in 4.6 days 35 . Light cruisers, with less displacement but also with less coal capacity, reflected similar limitations. The fact that the ratio of coal consumption to increased speed was geometric rather than arithmetic, made even the most careful calculations contingent upon the need for additional power in case of enemy action or unforeseen foul weather conditions.
Under wartime conditions, then, warships engaged in Kreuzerkrieg would have to replenish their coal supply at least once a week. The process of coaling, however, was such difficult, tedious, and time-consuming work, that warships could only refill their bunkers while at anchor in a sheltered harbor. Unlike fuel oil of a later time, which could be pumped through a flexible hose between two ships while they were moving at sea, coal had to be brought aboard in baskets or sacks. When in port, walkways would be erected so the crew -or preferably native handlers when they were available -could shuttle the heavy baskets of coal aboard from the depots ashore.
When no port facilities were available coal was brought alongside in colliers or lighters, shovelled into sacks, and swung up on deck in a cargo net by the ship's boom. From there the coal was dumped down the shutes into the bunkers. To attempt to coal a ship without doing so in port was a task that verged on the impossible. If Germany were to pursue a strategy of Kreuzerkrieg, she had to have a series of bases abroad from which the cruisers could operate. Mahan himself emphasized the steaming radius of warships and the need for a network of coaling stations »which every naval nation should frame for itself« 36 . Such bases (Stützpunkte) were later defined by Admiral Knorr at the OKM: »The ideal base is a good harbor favorably located, which offers everything necessary for the berthing, equipping, and maintenance of a large number of ships, and which, through natural and artificial defensive works, can hold out for a long time against a sea and land attack. «
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Germany indeed had a colonial empire, with possessions from Africa to the Far East; but did these possessions have the potential for supporting a cruiser-warfare strategy? Analysis of the existing territories and their harbors demonstrated they did not. Various colonial officials indeed realized the advantages of interesting the Navy in developing a naval base in the territories under their jurisdiction, for no other agency appeared likely to provide a suitable harbor. In Southwest Africa Imperial Commissioner v. Franfois was irritated at being dependent on British-owned Walfish Bay, and he prevailed on the Foreign Office to consider developing Swakopmund just to the north. The gunboat »Hyäne« had visited the inlet in April 1890, but at the time Captain Freiherr v. Sohlern reported it as unsuitable for development. At Franfois' repeated urgings »Hyäne« called again two years later, and this time successfully landed a party in surf boats. Franfois constructed a station building there and in February 1893 the small cruiser »Falke« described it as a satisfactory anchorage -but it was a long way from being a satisfactory Stützpunkt 38 . The sandy cove of Angra Pequena (renamed Lüderitz Bay) was also unsatisfactory, as were Lome in Togo and Duala in Kamerun.
In any case, cruiser-warfare based on the West African coast would not have a significant impact on British maritime commerce, as the primary trade routes were those from the Far East that converged at the Gulf of Aden to pass into the Red Sea and through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean. East Africa was, however, ideally located for operations against the Gulf of Aden traffic, and Dar-es-Salaam had an excellent harbor. The Navy was, in fact, to assist in developing it 39 . But British Zanzibar was, unfortunately, in sight across the bay, and British warships based on Aden would make cruiser-warfare a hazardous undertaking 40 . The South Sea islands of the Pacific offered potential harbors, but they were distant from significant trade routes, and the task and cost of constructing fortified Stützpunkte would be formidable 41 .
Even if the existing colonies were of no use to the Navy, they still had to be pacified and defended. The influence exercised by warships and landing parties was limited to the coastal areas, however, and to project power into the interior to pacify hostile natives was a formidable undertaking, and one for which the Navy was ill-equipped. The Arab revolt of 1888 in East Africa, occasioned by German interruption of the slave trade, necessitated the creation finally of colonial defense troops (Schutztruppen) -German army volunteers and native Askaris -to suppress it 42 . After peace was restored two years later, the colonial troops were continued on a permanent basis. The Colonial Department of the Foreign Office had neither the desire nor the experience to administer a military force however, and as there was no imperial »Army« (as there was a »Navy«), it would have been inappropriate to put the imperial colonial or protectorate forces under one of the states, specifically Prussia. For these reasons, as well as the geographic and transportation factors involved, it was decided to put the Schutztruppen administratively under the Navy. This was made official on March 22, 1891. The Kaiserliche Schutztruppen were also formed in Southwest Africa in 1894 and in Kamerun in 1895. (Only native police troops were created for Togo and the South Seas.)
For personnel and military affairs (including equipping, training, and military justice) the Schutztruppen were administered by the RMA, while their pay and operational utilization were handled by the Foreign Office and civilian governor or commissioner respectively. »This duplication was not entirely fortunate«, wrote a Schutztruppen Captain later, »all the more so as the troops were, and remained, an inconvenient appendage for the Reichsmarineamt which considered them as completely alien.« On July 16, 1896 the Schutztruppen were officially transferred to the Kolonialabteilung 43 . The Navy had no interest in the colonial troops, nor in the colonies themselves. The colonies had been acquired for economic and political reasons, and were unrelated to any strategic or logistical requirements of the Imperial Navy. The colonies merely constituted further responsibilities for a service that was already pressed to meet its worldwide obligations, and the Navy came to resent the continual requests for warships and landing parties. In none of her existing overseas possessions then, did Germany have the potential for the network of bases the Kreuzerkrieg advocates felt necessary. Given this situation, and taking such a strategy to its logical conclusion, the German Navy of the 1890s would be expected to actively promote a colonial expansion that would satisfy its strategic and logistical needs. It was no coincidence, indeed, that Admiral Valois himself was the Executive Vice President of the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (German Colonial Society) for a time, and that a number of other naval officers were members of that society 44 . The Colonial Society and the Flottenverein (Navy League), formed in April 1898 to advocate naval expansion, supported each other's efforts, and naval publications were sympathetic to colonial enterprises 45 . At the RMA Admiral Hollmann supported Valois and the Kreuzerkrieg proponents during his term of office. Yet apparently no specific plans were ever drawn up detailing a network of strategically located bases around the world, and no concerted policy was proposed to acquire particular places. One reason was certainly the disagreement within the Navy itself about strategic doctrine, and another was Hollmann's political difficulties in running the Navy at all, prodded by an impatient Kaiser and thwarted by an unsympathetic Reichstag. Intrudding into the realm of foreign policy with an expansionist program of colonial acquisition, and requesting additional funds to construct Flottenstützpunkte abroad, was politically unappealing. In any case there was an obvious dilemma confronting the Kreuzerkrieg advocates: the necessary bases would have to be acquired in a world already divided up by the colonial powers, and over which Great Britain exercised a preponderant influence. The obstacles to acquiring, fortifying, and maintaining bases overseas were thus formidable, and Hollmann's approach was one of extreme vacillation. German mercantile activity had meanwhile been increasing in the Far East, and the protection of the maritime trade there demanded an increased German naval presence. The Cruiser Squadron that had been formed off East Africa in 1888 remained in existence, and after 1890 was generally located East of Suez. Yet it had no base of its own for the necessary overhauling, repairs, and coal re-supply. Instead it depended on Nagasaki in Japan or British Hong Kong, and hence on the good-will of those nations. Its own requirements were thus low-priority, and at Hong Kong berthing space had to be reserved some nine months in advance, and even then might be cancelled at short notice 46 The initiative regarding the acquisition of a far eastern base thus came from the government itself, and only rather belatedly did the Foreign Office approach the Navy, on March 11, 1895, requesting criteria and possible locations for such a base. On April 17 Admiral Hollmann replied with the conclusions at which the RMA, as well as Admiral Knorr's OKM, had arrived 49 .
In the Navy's analysis, cruiser-warfare criteria for a harbor was subordinated to commercial potential. As German trade in East Asia extended from Singapore to Hakodate, Hollmann urged acquiring two bases, one in the north and one in the south, »which must be on the main trade routes, and must themselves already possess significance in a commercial respect; dead places, not capable of development, are worthless«. Commercial considerations would locate the Cruiser Squadron where its presence would be most useful, and developing harbor facilities that would benefit business interests as well as the Navy should encourage political cooperation between the two. Hollmann named and analyzed three pairs of locations in the order of their desirability: the Chusan Islands and Amoy, Kiaochow Bay and Mirs Bay, and Montebello Island (apparently near Korea) and the Pescadores Islands.
On that same 17th of April 1895 the defeated Chinese signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki -which in turn prompted the European powers to put pressure on Japan to surrender some of her gains, and pressure on China to grant »compensations« to themselves. At the height of the negotiations in September Berlin learned that a German mission station at Swatow on the South China Sea had been destroyed by Chinese anti-foreign elements, and the Kaiser had the OKM order the Cruiser Squadron to »make preparations to occupy Wei-hai-wei immediately upon telegraphed order« 50 . But the ships could not rendezvous for several days, the missionaries had not been personally harmed, and in any case the Navy was not happy with Wei-hai-wei. Located on the northern side of the Shantung Peninsula, it was isolated from the interior by mountains, and thus lacked the commercial potential the Navy believed desirable 51 .
Envoy Schenck did put forth Germany's demand for a coaling station, but this the Chinese successfully resisted. In the end, Russia and France both secured railroad and mining concessions, while Germany came out a poor third with two minor trading concessions in Hankow and Tientsin 52 . The opportunity to seize a base had been allowed to pass; but for the next two years, until the necessary »moral« pretext (the murder of two missionaries in November 1897), the German Navy and government made a thorough study of acquiring a port in China. This search was characterized by apprehension on the part of the Foreign Office, which sought to avoid antagonizing Great Britain or Russia by intruding into their spheres of influence, indecision on the part of the Navy, whose departments could not agree on any one location, and impatience on the part of the Kaiser, whose Prestigepolitik required some sort of acquisition 53 .
The Navy also showed reluctance to seize other opportunities that presented themselves. German sympathies were with the South African Boers in their resistance to British imperial encroachment; and when the Dr. Jameson raid into the Transvaal was foiled in December 1895, an indignant Kaiser convened a crown council meeting on January 3, 1896, including the three Navy heads, demanding the despatch of troops, landing at nearby Delagoa Bay, a protectorate over the Transvaal, or some other action to assist the Boers. In the summer of 1897 Tirpitz returned to Berlin to succeed Hollmann at the RMA, and with his accession to power the Kreuzerkrieg concept came to an end. Tirpitz's appointment as State Secretary of the RMA was the victorious culmination to a power struggle that had been continuing for several years within the ranks of the Navy 61 .
While the causes, issues, and consequences of this power struggle were complex and varied, the formulation of strategic doctrine played a signal role. Knorr at the OKM opposed Hollmann over the Kreuzerkrieg issue, as did Gustav v. Senden-Bibran of the MK, if for other reasons. 43
Even as Tirpitz was returning from East Asia, Admiral v. Knorr prepared a memorandum on the future of the Navy. In a struggle with France and Russia, Germany's most probable opponents, the protection of maritime trade and overseas colonies would best be accomplished by a battle fleet, concentrated in home waters, decisively defeating the enemy battle fleets. Should a war with England occur, »which we should hardly expect to fight alone, our value as an ally would be greatly increased for other sea powers« 62 . Knorr then proposed a tentative outline for such a battle fleet of twenty-eight battleships by 1910, and the concept of a powerful German Navy had been born. It was to be based on the construction of a battleship fleet, a strategy of decisive fleet action in home waters, and the »alliance value« of such a fleet. Tirpitz revised and expanded this concept when he arrived, in a memorandum to the Kaiser on June 15, 1897. He felt that Great Britain, as the leading sea-power, was Germany's most dangerous potential enemy. Commerce-raiding from overseas bases was hopeless in view of English superiority, and »our fleet must be so constructed that it can unfold its greatest military potential between Helgoland and the Thames«. Constructing and employing cruisers abroad would be to the detriment of the battle fleet in home waters. »Only the main theater of war will be decisive. It was ironic, of course, that Kiaochow's strategic significance had already declined with Tirpitz's accession to office, and his determination to build a battle fleet in home waters, rather than cruisers abroad. But as long as German trade with the Far East was increasing, and Germany would be participating in political decisions there, the Navy would have to maintain warships in the area. Given that political fact, and the logistical difficulties of servicing and maintaining a squadron some 10,000 nautical miles from the nearest German naval base, the advantages of Kiaochow were obvious to all elements of the Navy. Tirpitz himself later always took a special interest in Kiaochow, and sought to advance its development, not only as a naval base, but also as a commercial and cultural enterprise. He insisted it be administered by the RMA, rather than by the OKM or the Foreign Office; and when a later governor, Admiral Oskar Truppel, opposed the creation of a German-Chinese Hochschule, Tirpitz fired him 68 .
Whatever the value of Kiaochow, it was not as a base in a projected network of Stütz-punkte for a cruiser-warfare strategy. Financing cruisers and bases abroad would be detrimental to the building of Tirpitz's battle fleet in home waters. Tirpitz's concept was confirmed as the result of the Spanish-American War a few months later, when Spain's colonial empire was obliterated in a few weeks, primarily by decisive fleet action. Spain's overseas bases proved to be death-traps for the warships caught there. »The experiences of the recent war«, maintained the naval journal Nauticus, »con-firm that the principles of the German Navy, as laid down as the reason for the (new) Navy Law, are on the correct path for the construction of the fleet.« Regarding the jeune ecole doctrine, »Kreuzerkrieg is a Utopia!« 69 No detailed plans for acquiring a network of bases strategically located around the world was ever drawn up, no bases of any significance were ever developed in any of Germany's colonies, and no bases were acquired elsewhere. A residual Navy interest in further colonial acquisitions, rationalized by the desirability of additional coaling stations, continued to influence at least the OKM, which dealt with logistical problems, and its successor, the Admiralstab der Marine (AdM) or Admiralty Staff of the Navy. In his long memorandum of July 13,1898 on overseas bases, Knorr concluded, »The only advantage of Stützpunkte, in a war with England, would be that they would attract and hold enemy forces.« Little money should be wasted on them. »This conclusion, however, should not be taken to oppose the acquisition of overseas territories, if such opportunities offer themselves.« Coaling stations would still be convenient, as long as they could be acquired without difficulty 73 . But this interest was a very peripheral one, and in no way reflected German naval strategy or policy.
American preoccupation with the Spanish war did prompt Knorr to point out to the Kaiser the advantages of a coaling station in the Caribbean Sea, mentioning Curafao and Aruba in the Dutch West Indies and St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John in the Danish West Indies. The Dominican Republic, in fact, even offered Germany a naval base (presumably to offset an imperialistically ambitious America). But the Kaiser realized there was more involved than maritime requirements, and regarding the latter offer he said that he »would not fall into such a trap« nor did he wish to »set himself at odds with the United States« 74 . Albert Ballin, director of the Hamburg-America steamship line (HAPAG), did pursue the idea of a Caribbean coaling station, and received Tirpitz's support in devising a plan to buy the Danish island of St. John. Chancellor Hohenlohe and the Kaiser opposed the idea, however, and it was dropped 75 . There was nothing sinister, of course, about naval -or mercantile -interest in possible coaling stations, as coaling was a concern of all maritime nations. (These same Virgin Islands were purchased by the United States in 1917.) On their routine patrols German warships visited numerous other locations, including Spanish Fernando Po off West Africa, and the Farisan Islands in the Red Sea. The Turks did apparently agree to the erection of a German coal shed in the Farisan Islands for a nominal rental fee; but the islands were hot, barren, and infected with cholera, the Red Sea would be too easily controlled by the Royal Navy in wartime, and Aden was more convenient in peacetime 76 . The Foreign Office later suggested a coaling station on the Pacific coast of Mexico at Magdalena Bay. But the AdM believed that the United States would object, and it was soon learned that the Americans had leased the bay for three years anyway 77 . Other Admiralty Staff studies included the Chagos and Maldive Islands in the Indian Ocean, Pulo Lankawi in the Strait of Malacca, and Sumbawa Island in the Dutch East Indies. As the first two island groups were controlled by Britain, such acquisitions would presumably have been negotiated. Like the Manila Bay incident, the Samoan imbroglio, which broke out into violence again in January 1899, also reflected a confusion of goals. Only on October 10 did Foreign Secretary Bülow write both Tirpitz at the RMA and Admiral Felix Bendemann, chief of the new AdM, regarding the Navy's desires. The government, he said, was considering relinquishing its claims to the Samoan and nearby Tonga Islands, in exchange for compensation elsewhere, particularly in the Solomon Islands and the mouth of the Volta on the West African gold coast, adjacent to German Togoland 78 . Bendemann and Tirpitz both felt the Solomons and the Volta were worthless. Bendemann suggested the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean, and Tirpitz named Zanzibar and Walfish Bay. But Tirpitz argued strongly in favor of Samoa itself, both as a naval base and as a station for a trans-oceanic cable. Yet he knew that the United States would get the only decent harbor in the group, Pago-Pago at Tutuila, and it is apparent that Tirpitz only wanted to prolong the quarrel to point up the need for a larger German Navy 79 . In the treaty concluded on November 14, 1899, Germany received Upolu and Savaii, in neither of which the Navy had any interest. The Samoan quarrel may have assisted Tirpitz's new Navy Bill in the Reichstag, but the decisive factor came with the South African War and British suspicion that the Germans were supplying the Boers. In December 1899 British warships seized the German mail steamer »Bundesrath«, and in January 1900 stopped the steamers »Gene-ral« and »Herzog«, on suspicion of carrying contraband. German indignation was intense, and the impunity with which the British stopped German ships awakened the German public, as nothing else might have, to their utter helplessness on the high seas. »Now at last«, gloated Tirpitz, »and thanks to the English, we are sure of getting the support we need for the Reichstag to pass the new Navy Bill.« 80 A German battle fleet might indeed restrain English arrogance, but German dependence on the coaling ports of the British Empire was once again exasperatingly manifested in the summer of 1900. As a demonstration of German naval power at the time of the Boxer Rebellion, the Kaiser despatched a large force, including the four latest »Brandenburg«-class battleships, to the Far East; but they had to coal at Gibraltar, Port Said, Aden, Colombo, and Singapore to get there 81 . Coal resupply remained the greatest problem for warships abroad confronted with a superior naval power. Land depots would be too easily patrolled or destroyed, nor could warships themselves be accompanied by slow colliers. In 1910 the RMA approached the Hamburg-America Line, hoping that with the HAPAG's numerous ships and foreign commercial connections, some arrangements for coaling warships could be made. But the HAPAG's ships themselves would be hard-pressed to find safety, and the problems of distributing code-books and changing cipher systems and radio frequencies were formidable. »The result was negative«, concluded the RMA 87 . Individual transports and warships abroad were given secret wartime instructions, directing them to neutral ports or isolated rendezvous, depending on their location and the alignment of belligerents. In all cases they were to avoid being trapped in German colonial harbors 88 . The colonial officials gradually realized that the Navy could not be depended on to protect the colonies in time of war, and on . Surrendering the coast meant that the colonies could not be supplied or reinforced, and that warships could not be reprovisioned or repaired. The colonies and the warships on foreign station were on their own. When war did come in August 1914, the German warships abroad were rapidly swept from the high seas. Graf Spee's Cruiser Squadron quickly departed Kiaochow, but its chances of ever returning to Germany were remote. The other isolated cruisers and gunboats were all soon interned or destroyed. Disguised auxiliaries (Hilfskreuzer) and U-boats were effective commerce-raiders later, but they did not operate from bases overseas. Though some colonial forces resisted from the interior, the maritime approaches to the colonies were controlled by the Royal Navy. The strength of the Royal Navy abroad rested not only with the numbers of warships maintained, but also in the profusion of bases and maintenance facilities and the colonial military forces of the Empire itself. Tirpitz was astute enough to appreciate that actual control of the sea abroad required far more than mere warships, and was unwilling to make the commitment necessary to make Germany a first-rate imperial power. But he did hope that political decisions overseas could be influenced by a military weapon within European waters themselves, hence the battle fleet. It is academic to speculate on what colonial ambitions Tirpitz would have entertained had his battle fleet reached »parity« or »superiority« vis-a-vis the Royal Navy 95 . The naval arms race consumed all the resources of the German Navy, and the development of expensive overseas bases would have been not only irrelevant, but actually financially detrimental, to the continued growth of a battle fleet. Whatever the ambitions of Germany's colonial administrators and enthusiasts, they came to realize that the German Navy had no interest in pursuing an expansionist colonial policy. 
